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Introduction 
According to antimonopoly law provisions of CIS (Commonwealth of Independent 
States) countries, if price collusion/concerted actions of manufacturers in goods markets 
result in competition restriction (by fixing of monopolistically low prices which compli-
cates market access for other business entities) or infringement of economic interests of 
other business entities or consumers (through fixing of a monopolistically high price) they 
are considered to be illegal [1]–[3]. In exceptional cases, agreements and concerted actions 
of that kind can be recognized to be admissible on condition that they result in process im-
provement, growth in sales of goods, stimulation of technological and economic progress 
or worldwide recovery of domestic goods competitiveness, i. e. when social welfare 
growth in the long term exceeds short-term losses to society [4]. Thereupon the assessment 
of short- and long-term social consequences of price collusion (concerted actions) of 
manufacturers in goods markets is an actual problem from the point of view of antitrust 
regulation. At the same time, our analysis of publications devoted to researches of 
inefficiency of price collusion has made it possible to establish absence of practical 
procedures which can give the complex objective quantitative assessment of consequences 
of the named actions. The present work aims to solution of this problem. 
Objectives and Methodology 
The objective of this research is to develop methodological approaches to the 
quantitative assessment of inefficiency of price collusion and concerted actions of 
manufacturers in oligopoly goods markets in short and long terms. 
According to that objective, the following problems are raised and solved: 
– analysis of known approaches to assessment of influence of price collusion and con-
certed actions of manufacturers on public welfare available in the literature; 
– development of the method of assessment of social losses (inefficiency) caused by 
the presence of manufacturer's price collusion in goods markets; 
– testing this method on the basis of the Belarusian plywood market for determination 
of necessity of antitrust regulation of this market. 
The research method and initial data. To achieve the objective, we applied 
monographic and simulation methods of researches. Antimonopoly laws of the CIS 
countries and papers of foreign authors analyzing oligopoly market pricing and influence 
of industry market organization on social welfare were used as an informational 
background. Financial reporting of plywood manufacturers, data of National Statistical 
Committee of Belarus and data of Pricing Policy Committee of Belarus for 2006–2010 
were used as initial data for a quantitative analysis. 
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Our researches of the market of plywood, particle boards and fiberboards of Belarus resulted 
in a conclusion about possible tacit price collusion of the industry manufacturers (see [5]).  
Theoretical Background 
Theoretical fundamentals of the assessment of industry structure efficiency 
According to the literature, it is necessary to segregate three types of industrial cost effi-
ciency, namely allocative, productive (technological), and dynamic ones [6]–[8]. Alloca-
tively and productively inefficient industries can be dynamicly efficiency. That is because 
monopoly profit obtained by price collusion participants enables them to finance develop-
ment of innovations and thereby to increase social welfare in the long term and to compen-
sate short-term static efficiency losses. At the same time, dynamic inefficiency cannot be ex-
cluded since collusive oligopolists have smaller incentives to technology renewal (in this 
case, social losses are equivalent to those from X-inefficiency and product update [7], [9]. 
The reason is that they obtain smaller additional profit from the same innovation in compari-
son with Bertrand competition firms. Hence, to make objective decisions on suppression of 
price collusion of commodity manufacturers because of public welfare reduction, it is neces-
sary, firstly, to estimate the probability that collusion’s participants will have incentives for 
innovations because of their greater financial abilities to innovate; secondly, to compare so-
cial welfare losses stipulated by commodity market monopolization with growth of this wel-
fare due to (possible) dynamic efficiency of the monopolized market in the long term. 
Existing approaches to analysis and assessment of inefficiency of price collusion 
(concerted actions). We have established that the analysis of inefficiency of price collu-
sion (obvious and nonobvious ones) assumes solving three main problems. 
1. The allocative efficiency loss assessment. A basic criterion of allocative efficiency is the 
amount of social welfare loss which is determined in the literature through assessment of re-
source allocation efficiency [10]–[12]. Maximum allocative efficiency is achieved at the point 
where marginal costs equal consumer’s willingness to pay (price of goods). The larger is the 
difference between the price and marginal costs, the larger are social welfare loss and the lower 
is allocative efficiency due to lack of resources directed at manufacturing of these goods. 
Multiple researchers have studied the problem of quantitative assessment of welfare 
losses in the conditions of considerable deviation of the price of goods from marginal costs 
and tried to say whether these losses are large enough to be grounds for interference of an-
timonopoly authorities [10]–[16]. The priority in studying these problems belongs to Har-
berger who proposed to assess net social loss (W) as: 
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1 EMPQW = , (1) 
where P  is the price established in the monopolized market; Q is the production volume 
(output) in this market; M  is the relative deviation of the price from marginal costs 
(Lerner index); E  is the price elasticity of demand. In the process of testing this model on 
the basis of the U.S. processing industry, the above author equated the elasticity of demand 
to unity that is why net losses were specified as sales volume multiplied by 2
2
1 M . The 
sum of these losses over all markets studied by Harberger on the assumption that all prod-
ucts were sold only in the consumer markets was about 0.1 % of GDP [10]. 
Stigler criticized Harberger's calculations on several points including the unit assess-
ment of the price elasticity of demand that did not correspond to exclusive profit maximi-
zation [13]. The point is that the unit price elasticity of demand occurs when the marginal 
revenue .0=MR  But then MC  of a monopolist who maximizes profits should also be 
equal to zero what is impossible. In case of ,0>= MCMR  the elasticity exceeds unity, and 
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there by welfare losses exceed those specified by Harberger. Cowling and Mueller passed 
over the necessity for determination of a value of the price elasticity of demand [14]. They 
have shown that in case of Cournot competition the profit margin is inversely proportional 
to the elasticity of demand faced by a firm: 
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where H is the Lerner index.  
Then, at high H (for the monopoly and also in the conditions of collusion or concerted 
actions H can be accepted to be unity), the following equality takes place: 
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Thus, social losses form half of the profit of a monopolistic firm (cartel). Then Cowl-
ing and Mueller showed that damages caused by market power (noncompetitive pricing) 
were not only reduced to irretrievable losses [14]. They supplemented their model with ex-
penses for reaching and preserving a monopolistic position, namely advertising expenses (A) 
and net profit of the monopoly ( 'π  is an upper boundary of the monopoly’s costs for crea-
tion of artificial barriers to entry the industry), and obtained: 
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2
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This model has been criticized by a number of authors for a high degree of overstate-
ment of welfare losses [15], [17]. Littlechild considered profit as a short-term phenomenon 
resulting from successful entrepreneurship and not from monopoly preservation. If the mo-
nopoly is a result of successful innovation, monopoly profit and consumer surplus at mo-
nopolistic production are social gain because both of them would be lost for society with-
out innovations [17]. Cowling and Mueller concentrated their attention on successful firms 
and simply took into account temporary and subsequently vanishing advantages of more 
successful firms [14]. Criticism of this approach by Hay and Morris is connected with as-
sessment of advertising effects which are negative for welfare as well as the use of monop-
oly profits in fighting for the monopoly position [18]. 
Hay and Morris suggested to use one of indices of market concentration as a substitute 
for direct measurement of welfare losses. For the oligopoly with homogeneous goods and 
firms with symmetric costs (and in the assumption of constant marginal costs), they 
showed that welfare losses are equivalent to: 
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where π  is the industry contribution margin (when an operating leverage factor <<1, this 
value can be accepted as gross profit) [18]. 
Then this model was supplemented with positive expected variations of price behavior 
of oligopolists ,β  which were interpreted as a degree of oligopolist's collusion, and took on 
form )1(
2
1 β+π= HW  thus complicating the use of H  as welfare losses. 
2. Production (technological) efficiency loss assessment. Influence of production effi-
ciency on social welfare was studied by Comanor and Leibenstein, Parish and Ng, and 
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Dixit and Stern [19]–[21]. Here, the losses associated with production inefficiency are 
connected with direct waste of productive resources exhibited in the form of either expen-
diture of resources for acquisition or retention of the monopoly power (rent-seeking costs), 
or production with costs exceeding the lowest attainable ones at existing technologies.  
The losses stipulated by excess of monopoly costs over the competitive ones include, 
firstly, losses in the form of resource over-expenditure (the same output volume could be 
produced with smaller expenditures) and, secondly, nonoptimal resource allocation losses. 
3. Dynamic efficiency loss assessment. Unlike static inefficiency having positive crite-
ria of assessment, dynamic efficiency losses caused by market monopolization are assessed 
indirectly by assumptions on the presence of stimuli of its participants to innovate. There 
are two opposite points of view about the market monopolization influence on dynamic 
efficiency in the literature.  
The first one is that firms in monopolized markets have smaller stimuli to renewal of 
technologies and products due to several reasons [22]–[24].  
The first reason is the absence of competition.  
The second reason is smaller additional profits they obtain, for example, from applica-
tion of the same technological innovation in comparison with the firms cooperating in 
competitive markets. Indeed, suppose that industry manufacturers compete in Cournot 
fashion and manufacture similar products. Industry demand is given by bQaQP −=)(  and 
a cost function of i th firm is given by ).( iii qcС =  The technological innovation results in 
reduction of the innovator firm’s marginal costs which become equal to ),1( kcс hl −=  
where k is the coefficient of marginal cost reduction due to the technological innovation. In 
this case, an absolute increase in profit of the innovating monopolist is: 
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For the innovator firm operating in the competitive procedure conditions (i. e. with un-
equal access to technologies) and seizing the market due to the technological innovation, 
the profit increase is: 
 .0)1(/ ckqqkcpqкои =−−−=πΔ  (7) 
Thus, according to the model that we have constructed, the monopolist has much less 
stimuli to invest in R&D, i. e. the compensation effect is observed.  
The third reason relates to high probability of market penetration by potential competi-
tors or collusion violation after innovation development [5].  
The second point of view is that monopolized markets are dynamically effective [25]–[29]. 
In this case, the necessity of securing (preserving) the monopoly position acts as a stimulus 
for innovation. Etro F. showed that, to create or increase barriers to entry, monopolists 
would increase production volumes, reduce prices, and invest in R&D, thus disabling po-
tential competitors to enter the market [26]. In case of high barriers to entry, cooperation of 
potential competitors for overcoming existing barriers and penetrating the monopolized 
market is probable. That means monopolists always have a stimulus to innovate irrespec-
tive of the height of barriers to entry. 
Thus, our analysis makes it possible to conclude that quantitative integral indices of 
static and dynamic efficiencies of price collusion (concerted actions) of commodity manu-
facturers and index assessment methods as well as indices for assessing stimuli of partici-
pants of price collusion (concerted actions) to innovate are now undisclosed. 
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Method of Assessment of Industry Static and Dynamic Inefficiencies 
Generalizing the above concerning allocative and technological efficiency, the industry 
equilibrium in the collusion conditions, for example, for six firms, i. e. for i = 1, …, 6, can 
be illustrated by Fig. 1. 
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Fig. 1. Social welfare loss caused by static inefficiency in the conditions of collusion 
of commodity manufacturers. Source: [18] 
Here, the contribution margin π is presented by a shaded area. A supply curve is de-
scribed by a step function: firms with smaller costs have larger market shares (to improve 
collusion stability, firms redistribute market shares proportionally to technological effi-
ciency [5]. Out-of-pocket unit costs of the largest firm 1c  reflect the best production tech-
nology in the industry. The rest of the firms are less effective, but they are viable in the 
given market as ....,, 62 ccp >  Welfare losses (W) are the sum of areas of triangle ABD and 
irregular figure ABF representing a value of technological inefficiency of the industry, or 
the difference of areas of figures AHGD and AHGF which are losses of consumer surplus 
due to excess of the monopoly price over expenditures of the most effective firm and the 
contribution margin, respectively. If the supply curve is of the form of EappQ −=)(  and 
E
s
p
c 11 1−=   (from the firm equilibrium condition), the area of figure AHGD is equal to 
([18], [21]): 
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For sufficiently small ,/1 Es  the following equality holds: 
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Then losses of consumer surplus are: 
 .1sE
pQAHGD ≈  (10) 
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And social welfare losses are: 
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Thus, the total welfare losses due to allocative and technological inefficiency are di-
rectly proportional to a ratio of the share of the industry leading firm (with the lowest ex-
penditures) to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The greater market share of the leading 
firm means the greater price (
1
1
sE
Ecp −= ), and, hence, greater consumer surplus losses. 
The greater Herfindahl-Hirschman index means the smaller output of less effective firms. 
Hence, a majority of consumer surplus turns into the manufacturer’s profit and a minority 
is absorbed by high costs [18]. 
Results  
Method of assessment of industry dynamic inefficiencies in the collusion condi-
tions 
We have established that dynamic efficiency of the industry in the collusion conditions 
(concerted actions) is reached, when the following inequality holds: 
 ( )∑= ≥+
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1 , (12) 
where In is the average payback period for investments in innovations (technological, 
product/offering, marketing, organizational, etc.) in the industry (years); 
It  is the average period of development of innovations in the industry, namely a time 
period between the beginning of investments in innovations and the emergence of mone-
tary flows associated with their use (years); 
r is the debt capital rate of interest for the industry firms; 
WId is the fraction of funds obtained by collusion participants and invested in innova-
tions; 
ROI  is the average industry profitability of investments in innovations (technological, 
product , marketing, organizational, etc.). It is determined by the formula: 
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where tttt OrgMarTechProd ,,,  are industry profits from product, technological, marketing, 
and  organizational innovations, respectively, in t th year (Br m); 
orgmartechprod IIII ,,,   are industry investments into product, technological, marketing, 
and organizational innovations, respectively (Br m). 
Thus, dynamic efficiency of the industry in the conditions of collusion (concerted ac-
tions) is directly proportional to the average industry profitability of investments in innova-
tions and the social welfare loss fraction invested from own funds of the industry firms in 
innovations. Besides, it is inversely proportional to the average payback period for invest-
ments in innovations, the average industry period of development of innovations, and the 
ЭКОНОМИКА И УПРАВЛЕНИЕ НАРОДНЫМ ХОЗЯЙСТВОМ 115
debt capital rate. It should be noted that calculations by formula (13) can be performed 
separately for every type of innovations. 
In case of insufficient input data for using formula (12), dynamic efficiency of the in-
dustry can be assessed with the aid of particular indices presented in Tabl. 1. 
Table 1 
Proposed system of particular indices of the industry dynamic efficiency 
Index / Influence on dynamic efficiency Calculation procedure 
Industry average rate of growth of marginal costs in 
real terms MCrtT  / Negative t
t
MCrt MC
MCT
1−
=
t
t
Ip
Ip 1− , 
where 1, −ttMC  is industry average marginal 
costs of the firm within t and t – 1 (Br m); 
1, −ttIp  is the price index within the same 
period 
Fraction of funds obtained by collusion participants 
and invested in innovations WId  / Positive W
Id ownWI = , 
where ownI  is investments in innovations 
from own funds of the industry firms (Br m) 
Industry average profitability of investments in in-
novations ( ROI ) / Positive See formula (13) 
Industry average payback period of firm's invest-
ments in innovations In  (years) / Negative 
– 
Industry average period of development of innova-
tions It  (years) / Negative 
– 
Source: Independent research. 
 
The quantitative assessment of innovation stimuli of participants of price collusion in 
oligopoly markets can be made with the aid of the following expression: 
 ( ) .
1
1
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 (14) 
Thus, in case of the presence of price collusion in the industry, their participants obtain 
positive economic effects from innovations in the conditions of smaller capital investments 
and (or) at smaller efficiency of these investments than are required for ensuring dynamic 
efficiency of the industry. Conditions (12) and (14) make it possible to explain why price 
collusion of oligopolists are often statically as well as dynamically ineffective despite the 
presence of larger financial resources for investments than without collusion. 
Assessment of efficiency of collusion in the market of plywood, particle boards 
and fiberboards of Belarus 
Our researches of the market of plywood, particle boards and fiberboards of Belarus 
resulted in a conclusion about possible tacit price collusion of the industry manufacturers 
(see [5]). However, to make a decision about the necessity of antimonopoly regulating of 
the industry, assessment of the social welfare losses caused by this price collusion of the 
manufacturers is required. To solve this problem, we have used the above stated methodo-
logical approach to assessment of static and dynamic industry efficiency (Tabl. 2–4). 
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Table 2 
Dynamics of indices of static and dynamic efficiency of the studied plywood market 
in 2006–2010. Source: Independent research 
Plywood market Index 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1. Static efficiency losses 
1. Static efficiency losses: 13.5 18.7 17.3 15.7 27.1
1.1 Static efficiency losses ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −π=π 11H
sW
 
(Br m)
 
  11.8 13.2 15.9 11.5 24.1
1.2 Static efficiency losses
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= 11
H
sFCWFC  (Br m) 1.68 5.50 1.40 4.15 3.03
Net static efficiency losses W  (Br m). 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.02
2. Particular indices of dynamic efficiency 
2.1 Industry average rate of growth of marginal costs in real terms 
MCrtT   
1.16 1.22 1.16 0.91 1.36
2.2 Fraction of funds obtained by collusion participants and in-
vested in innovations WId  
0.00 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.20
Table 3 
Dynamics of indices of static and dynamic efficiency of the studied particle board market 
in 2006–2010. Source: Independent research 
Particle board market Index 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1. Static efficiency losses 
1. Static efficiency losses: 7.08 11.8 10.2 11.0 8.05
1.1 Static efficiency losses ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −π=π 11H
sW
 
(Br m)
 
  6.32 9.77 9.26 8.64 7.46
1.2 Static efficiency losses
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= 11
H
sFCWFC  (Br m) 0.76 2.00 0.97 2.34 0.58
Net static efficiency losses W  (Br m). 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01
2. Particular indices of dynamic efficiency 
2.1 Industry average rate of growth of marginal costs in real terms 
MCrtT   
1.11 1.13 1.23 1.10 1.19
2.2 Fraction of funds obtained by collusion participants 
and invested in innovations WId  
0.00 0.00 1.00 0.11 1.00
 
Table 4 
Dynamics of indices of static and dynamic efficiency of the studied fiberboard market 
in 2006–2010. Source: Independent research 
Fiberboard market Index 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1. Static efficiency losses 
1. Static efficiency losses: 6.93 7.86 7.96 2.42 2.71
1.1 Static efficiency losses ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −π=π 11H
sW
 
(Br m)
 
  3.92 4.22 2.70 1.53 1.47
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Table 4 
Fiberboard market Index 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1.2 Static efficiency losses
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= 11
H
sFCWFC  (Br m) 3.01 3.63 5.26 0.90 1.24
Net static efficiency losses W (Br m) 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.02
2. Particular indices of dynamic efficiency 
2.1 Industry average rate of growth of marginal costs in real terms 
MCrtT   
1.13 1.12 1.18 0.76 1.43
2.2 Fraction of funds obtained by collusion participants and invested 
in innovations WId  
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.23 0.24
Notes: 
1. Index 1.2 is calculated for a hypothetical case of regulating of the industry as a monopoly with use of 
an average cost regulation approach. 
2. Index 1.3 is the difference of indices 1.1 and 1.2. 
 
The indices presented in Tabl. 2–4 make it possible to draw the following conclusions. 
Studied markets are statically ineffective. During the period under consideration, net 
static efficiency losses varied within 1.4–5.5 and 0.58–2.3 Br billions or 1.1–4.7 % and 
0.8–3.5 % of sale proceeds in the plywood market and the particle board market, respec-
tively. The value of these losses forbids considering them to be an essential damage to so-
cial welfare because, firstly, the value is not substantial over the industry and, secondly, a 
part of funds obtained by enterprises has been invested in product and process innovations. 
That indicates a lack of necessity for antitrust regulation of the industry as it will result in 
7–30 % reduction of social welfare losses but involve essential administrative expenses. 
During the same period, net static efficiency losses in the particle board market were 
0.9–5.3 Br billions or 2.1–7.6 % of sale proceeds. They were not substantial for the indus-
try, but their innovation invested portion was also unessential and antitrust regulation of 
this market will result in 37–66 % reduction of social welfare losses.  
The absence of necessary data does not enable us to make definite assessment of in-
dustry dynamic efficiency. At the same time, particular indices presented in Tabl. 2 proba-
bly indicate dynamic inefficiency of the industry in the period under consideration as mar-
ginal costs of production of plywood, particle and fiber boards grew in real terms and a 
portion of funds obtained by manufacturers due to price collusion and invested in innova-
tions was very low. That indicates that manufacturers have insufficient stimuli for invest-
ing in innovations, probably, due to their low efficiency in comparison with current interest 
rates on debt capital. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Our study makes it possible to draw the following conclusions: 
1. To make economically feasible decisions in the field of antitrust regulation of obvi-
ous and nonobvious price collusion of manufacturers in the goods markets, quantitative 
assessment of short- and long-term consequences of these decisions for social welfare is 
required. In this connection, we have developed the method of assessment of social losses 
caused by price collusion in goods markets. This method consists in determination of static 
and dynamic efficiency losses caused by lowering competition in the market. The novelty 
of the method consists, firstly, in theoretical justification and formulation of the condition 
of industry dynamic efficiency as well as in determination of its factors such as the average 
industry profitability of investments into innovations, the fraction of social welfare losses 
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invested in innovations from own funds of the industry firms, the average payback period 
of investments in innovations, the average industry period of innovations, and the debt 
capital rate; secondly, in quantitative determination of the condition estimating stimuli of 
price collusion participants to innovate in oligopoly markets. Using this method, antimo-
nopoly bodies can make well-grounded decisions on the need of suppression of obvious 
and nonobvious price collusion in goods markets on the basis of correlation of short- and 
long term social welfare losses and antitrust regulation expenditures. 
2. It is also found that in the presence of explicit and tacit price collusion in the industry 
its participants obtain economic benefits from innovations under the condition of investment 
of smaller capital and(or) smaller efficiency of these investments than required for ensuring 
dynamic efficiency of the industry. In this connection, it is determined that from the point of 
view of improvement of social welfare, in the conditions of low capital intensity of innova-
tive activity and (or) its low profitability in the industry, high actual interest rates, and large 
innovation and payback periods, suppression of obvious and nonobvious price collusion of 
manufacturers in goods markets is an optimum strategy of antitrust regulation (but with al-
lowance for expenditures on administration of the oligopolists' activity). 
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